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The superior reconfigurability of software defined radio mobile devices has made it the most promising technology on the wireless
network and in the communication industry. Despite several advantages, there are still a lot to discuss regarding security, for
instance, the radio configuration data download, storage and installation, user’s privacy, and cloning. The objective of this paper
is to present a fraud-prevention framework for software defined radio mobile devices that enhances overall security through
the use of new pieces of hardware, modules, and protocols. The framework oﬀers security monitoring against malicious attacks
and viruses, protects sensitive information, creates and protects an identity for the system, employs a secure protocol for radio
configuration download, and finally, establishes an anticloning scheme, which besides guaranteeing that no units can be cloned
over the air, also elevates the level of diﬃculty to clone units if the attacker has physical access to the mobile device. Even if cloned
units exist, the anticloning scheme is able to identify and deny services to those units. Preliminary experiments and proofs that
analyze the correctness of the fraud-prevention framework are also presented.
Keywords and phrases: cellular frauds, cloning, security and privacy issues, security protocols, software defined radio mobile
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1. INTRODUCTION
Software defined radio [1] allows multiple radio standards
to operate on common radio frequency hardware, thereby
ensuring compatibility among legacy, current, and evolving
wireless communication technologies.
A software defined radio mobile device (SDR-MD) is ca-
pable of having its operation changed by dynamically load-
ing radio reconfiguration data (R-CFG files) over the air.
With diﬀerent R-CFGs, the device can operate using diﬀerent
wireless communication technologies while having a single
transceiver. A typical SDR-MD can manage communication
via satellite, over diﬀerent cellular technologies, VoIP (voice
over internet protocol), and operations over the internet.
One of the key issues in SDR wireless communication in-
volves security. According to the SDR Forum [2], some of
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the concerns are the R-CFG download, storage, and instal-
lation; user’s privacy, that is, protection of the user’s iden-
tity, location, and communication with other devices; and fi-
nally, SDR-MD cloning, that is, illegally using services that
are billed to someone else’s device.
To address the SDR Forum concerns and greatly en-
hance the overall security of SDR-MDs, a fraud-prevention
framework is proposed. The proposed framework oﬀers se-
curity monitoring against malicious attacks and viruses that
may aﬀect the configuration data, protects sensitive informa-
tion through the use of protected storage, creates and pro-
tects an identity for the system, employs a secure protocol
for R-CFG download, and finally, establishes an anticloning
scheme which guarantees that no units can be cloned over
the air, and elevates the level of diﬃculty to clone units if the
attacker has physical access to the SDR-MD. Even if cloned
units exist, the anticloning scheme is able to identify and
deny services to those units.
Preliminary practical experiments using java 2 micro-
edition (J2ME) [3] and proofs that analyze the correctness
of the fraud-prevention framework are also presented.
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2. BACKGROUND
Research work has been done for each of the SDR concerns
previously described; however, no published work has devel-
oped a solution that encompasses more than one of the con-
cerns at once. This section is divided according to the SDR
Forum concerns. For each subsection, some of the relevant
related research is presented.
2.1. R-CFG download, storage, and installation
In [4], the authors discuss a model for securing the R-CFG
download and installation that involves the use of secret de-
vice keys and signatures. All security operations take place
within tamper-proof hardware that also contains the pro-
grammable components of the transceiver. This approach
provides good security for the radio software that lies within
the tamper-proof hardware, but leads to some drawbacks
such as the use of nonstandard security methods, lack of a
means for third-party vendors to provide R-CFGs, and, most
important, lack of a means for securing radio software that
resides outside the tamper-proof hardware.
2.2. User’s privacy
Some eﬀorts, called privacy extension to Mobile IPv6, deal
with user’s privacy. The basic idea of these eﬀorts is to re-
place the MAC address of a mobile device with a random
one, called a temporal mobile identifier (TMI) [5] or pseu-
dorandom interface identifier (PII) [6].
In those schemes, personal mobile location privacy con-
trol relies on either the home administration, the foreign ad-
ministration, or both. Moreover, the home administration is
required to share some secrets with the foreign administra-
tion to prevent eavesdroppers from having any knowledge
about the binding users temporal identifiers and real iden-
tifiers. These eﬀorts cannot completely control mobile loca-
tion privacy by a mobile user since the administration can
associate any identifier (PII or TMI) with the corresponding
real ID of the mobile device.
2.3. SDR-MD cloning
The advancedmobile phone system (AMPS) [7] is the analog
mobile phone system standard introduced in the Americas
during the early 1980s. Despite the fact that it was a great ad-
vance in its time, the AMPS presented several security flaws,
and multiple copies of cloned mobile stations were created
with little diﬃculty.
The global system for mobile communication (GSM) [8]
is a globally accepted standard for digital cellular communi-
cation. The GSM authentication framework relies on special
cryptographic codes to authenticate customers and bill them
appropriately. A personalized smart card, called a SIM card,
stores a secret key that is used to authenticate the customer;
knowledge of the key is suﬃcient to make calls billed to that
customer.
The SIM card is easily removable so that the user can
use other cell phones. The drawback is that someone who
has physical access to the SIM card can copy the information
to another card, thereby cloning the authentication informa-
tion of the user.
Cloning the SIM card is a relevant flaw, however a much
more serious flaw was discovered. In [9] it is shown that the
cryptographic codes used for authentication are not strong
enough to resist attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, an in-
dividual would interact with the SIM card repeatedly to learn
the secret key and would then be able to clone the phone
without having to clone the SIM card. Although it was con-
sidered that the attacker had physical access to the SIM card,
it was mentioned that over-the-air attacks are possible, mak-
ing cloning on GSM cellphones a more serious threat.
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS) [10] is an open air-interface standard for third-
generation wireless telecommunications. It provides higher
data rates and fixes several security flaws encountered in the
GSM standard. Despite several advantages that the UMTS
standard provides, it also stores vital information in the SIM
card. Thus, like the GSM, someone might be able to copy the
authentication information from one SIM card to another.
Another drawback concerns the KASUMI block cipher,
which is at the core of the integrity and confidentiality mech-
anisms in the UMTS network. Hardware implementations
are required to use at most 10 000 gates and must achieve en-
cryption rates in the order of 2Mbps (maximum data rate).
Thus, a considerable eﬀort must be performed in order to
implement a high-performance hardware component that
carries out the operations of the KASUMI block cipher.
As a final remark, UMTS devices are not capable of re-
configuring their radio parameters via software. Thus, dual
mode or tri-mode expensive cell phones are necessary to
guarantee backward compatibility with other standards.
Simpler schemes that only detect cloned units and do not
try to prevent cloning have also been proposed. They can be
found in [11, 12].
2.4. Trusted computing group
The trusted computing group (TCG) [13] is an industry
standards body comprising computer and device manufac-
turers, software vendors, and others with an interest in en-
hancing the security of the computing environment across
multiple platforms and devices.
The TCG claims that it will develop and promote open
industry standard specifications for trusted computing hard-
ware building blocks and software interfaces across multiple
platforms, including personal computers (PCs), servers, per-
sonal digital assistants (PDAs), and digital phones.
So far the TCG has only presented specification for the
PC environment [14]. Some of the benefits include more se-
cure local data storage, a lower risk of identity theft, and the
deployment of more secure systems and solutions based on
open industry standards.
Despite the fact that the TCG specification for the PC
does point out and solve several security flaws, this specifi-
cation would not achieve a satisfactory performance if em-
ployed by constrained SDR-MDs.









































Figure 1: The preliminary design of the fraud-prevention framework.
3. THE FRAUD-PREVENTION
FRAMEWORK SPECIFICATION
The fraud-prevention framework is composed of new pieces
of hardware, new modules, and new protocols. Figure 1 de-
picts the preliminary design of the framework. The dashed
squares are the main contributions of this work.
Note that the SDR device manager (SDR-DM) is respon-
sible for managing all the communication with the outside
world and for requesting the services of each module when
needed. Also, the environment discoverer module is respon-
sible for detecting which wireless communication technolo-
gies are available in the current SDR-MD’s environment. This
module is assumed to be present in the software core SDR
framework and is outside the scope of this work.
The R-CFG manager is responsible for managing the
R-CFG files currently stored in the device and the R-CFG
currently installed. It also informs the SDR-DM when a dif-
ferent R-CFG is needed. The CFG manager is responsible for
managing the configuration (CFG) file. The CFG file is pro-
vided by the wireless operator (WO) and is used to set the
device’s phone number. Note that both the R-CFG and CFG
files are stored in an encrypted storage. Standard encryption
algorithms such as RC5 [15] and RSA [16] can be used to
provide the encryption storage. Other modules as well as ba-
sic definitions are discussed in separate subsections below.
3.1. Basic definitions
This section presents definitions, components, and entities
that participate in the fraud-prevention framework. The
nomenclature used to specify the framework is presented in
Table 1.
The entities that participate in the framework as well as
their responsibilities are defined in Table 2.
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Table 1: Basic definitions.
C A 48-bit random number (nonce)
KY{C} C is cryptographically transformed, somehow, with a key Y
MD(Z) Hash of Z
[C]Alice C is transformed using the private key of Alice
{C}Alice C is transformed using the public key of Alice
Attestation
It is used to check integrity status of a certain component. It is defined as the function Att(X),
which results in the hash of component X
Attestation key pair (AK)
It is used to obtain the attestation credential. Composed by the 2048-bit attestation private key
(AKpriv) and public key (AKpub)
Attestation credential (AC)
It is used to identify the SDR-MD. It is signed by the privacy credential authority (Privacy CA)
and it is presented whenever the user tries to use the network services. AC = [AKpub]Privacy CA
Null AC
When the SDR-MD discovers it is a cloned unit, it sets its AC to null.
Every bit in the AC is equal to 0
Endorsement key (EK)
It is used to uniquely identify the SDR-MD. It is never disclosed by the device.
Its size is also 2048 bits
R-CFG It is used to configure the radio of the SDR-MD
Valid R-CFG An R-CFG that has been approved by the regulatory agency
Invalid R-CFG
An R-CFG that has not been approved by the regulatory agency or it has been modified
after been approved by the regulatory agency
CFG
It is used to set up the phone number of the SDR-MD. It is signed by the WO.
CFG = [Phone no.]WO
Table 2: Entities and responsibilities.
Manufacturer (manuf.)
Produces the SDR-MD. Generates the R-CFGs. Generates the SDR-MD’s EK and informs
the Privacy CA about the EK. Calculates and stores the Att(EK) in the SDR-MD
Installs the initial R-CFG and stores the Att(R-CFG) in the SDR-MD
Regulatory agency (RA)
Tests, approves, and licenses the R-CFG. Basically, the RA tests the R-CFG in the specific hardware to ensure
that the device does not cause interference or function out of its defined spectrum, as defined in [17]
WO
Sells the SDR-MD. Provides communication services. Generates the CFG
Authenticates the SDR-MD to use the network. Detects cloned SDR-MDs
Privacy CA Provides the SDR-MD with an AK pair, the AC, and the WO public key
SDR-MD Utilizes the network services. Downloads R-CFGs and CFGs files. Detects if it is a cloned or valid unit
3.2. The tamper-protected hardware package
The TPHP must be physically protected from tampering.
This includes physically binding it to the other physical parts
of the SDR-MD such that it cannot be easily disassembled
and transferred to other devices. These mechanisms are in-
tended to resist tampering. Tamper evidence measures are to
be employed. Such measures enable detection of tampering
upon physical inspection. The package must limit pin prob-
ing and EMR scanning. Similar tamper-protected hardware
is the trusted platform module of [13] and the Intel wireless
trusted platform processor [18].
The TPHP is composed of two tamper resistant chips
(TRCs): TRC1, which is read only, and TRC2, which is
read/write. The TRC1 contains the EK, the attestation en-
gines responsible for measuring, reporting, and comparing
integrity values, and a specialized hardware to generate 48-bit
random numbers. The TRC2 contains the attestation engine
responsible for storing integrity values and protected non-
volatile memory to store the necessary keys. Notice that the
TPHP comes from the manufacturer with the RA’s public key
already stored.
The attestation engines are divided into the attesta-
tion measurement engine (AMEng), attestation store engine
(ASEng), attestation report engine (AREng), and attestation
comparison engine (ACEng). Table 3 presents the functions
of each attestation engine. Figure 2 depicts the components
of the TPHP as it comes from the manufacturer.
3.3. The secure SDR R-CFG download protocol
To install only valid R-CFGs, a secure SDR R-CFG download
protocol is defined as part of the fraud-prevention frame-
work. The secure protocol employs the mutual authentica-
tion and R-CFG validation and verification steps described
by the R-CFG/CFG security module.
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Table 3: Attestation engines and functions.
AM Eng
Measures Att(EK), Att(R-CFG), and Att(CFG),
and writes the results into R0, R1 and R2
AS Eng
Stores the Att(EK) in register 0(R0), the Att(R-CFG)
in register 1(R1), and the Att(CFG) in register 2(R2)
AR Eng Reads and reports the values of the registers
AC Eng
Compares the values of R0, R1, and R2, reported by
the AR Eng, with the values measured by the AM Eng
Whenever a manufacturer generates a new R-CFG, it has
to send the R-CFG to be approved and licensed by the RA.
This is called R-CFG validation.
To perform R-CFG validation, the protocol employs a
public-private key mechanism. The manufacturer sends to
the RA a combination of a header, which contains manufac-
turer, model, serial number range, and possibly some other
information; the new R-CFG; and the hardware in which the
R-CFG is to be tested and used.
The RA installs the R-CFG in the specified device and
tests the device’s behavior. If no malfunction is observed,
the RA approves the R-CFG and assigns it a license num-
ber. During the test, the RA computes h = MD(header‖R-
CFG). The value h is then signed with the RA’s private key,
[h]RA. Figure 3 depicts the signing step. The signed hash
value, [h]RA, is sent back to the manufacturer along with the
assigned license number.
Once the R-CFG has been licensed, signed, and placed on
a server, the SDR-MDs can contact the server at any time to
download the combination of header, R-CFG, and [h]RA.
After an SDR-MD has connected to the manufacturer’s
server, mutual authentication is performed. The mutual
authentication step avoids masquerade and replay attacks.
When using an unsecured connection, this is done by ex-
changing random challenges (nonces) or by certificates,
while when using a secure connection, the protocol that pro-
vides the secure connection is assumed to take care of the
mutual authentication.
After the mutual authentication step has been success-
fully completed, the SDR-MD requests and downloads the
new R-CFG. Upon download completion, R-CFG verifica-
tion is necessary to guarantee that the R-CFG has been ap-
proved by the RA and properly signed. The verification step
also tests whether the R-CFG is appropriate for the device
(Figure 4).
However, to guarantee that the R-CFG has not beenmod-
ified after being approved and signed by the RA, the follow-
ing steps are performed:
(1) a new hash value h′ = MD(header‖R-CFG) is calcu-
lated;
(2) the received [h]RA is decrypted to obtain h;
(3) h and h′ are compared: if h = h′, the received R-CFG
is accepted. However, if h = h′, the R-CFG is rejected.
Figure 4 also shows the data integrity check. If the new R-
CFG has passed all the tests, it is then installed and the value
of Att(R-CFG) is stored in R1.
The steps of the secure SDR R-CFG download protocol
when using an unsecured connection, such as HTTP, are de-
picted in Figure 5. Dashed arrows indicate communication
inside the SDR-MD.
Although the protocol is specified using an unsecured
connection, the R-CFG is still protected since it is encrypted
with the EK, thus only that specific device which has initi-
ated the connection can correctly decrypt and install the R-
CFG. Details on how to obtain a lightweight secure connec-
tion using the Light SSL (LSSL) protocol, specified in the se-
cure/unsecured internet connectionmodule, can be found in
[19].
The SDR R-CFG download protocol initiates with the
SDR-MD contacting the manufacturer’s server and estab-
lishing an unsecured connection. Next, the SDR-MD sends
MD(EK) and a nonce C encrypted by the EK. The manufac-
turer maintains a database of all available EKs (M EKDB),
indexed by MD(EK). The database has all information that
the manufacturer needs about each SDR-MD it has pro-
duced.
When the manufacturer receives the MD(EK), it searches
in its M EKDB for that value. If it does not find theMD(EK),
the manufacturer ends the connection. On the other hand, if
MD(EK) is in M EKDB, then the manufacturer obtains the
EK of that device and generates a new nonce C′. The C′ is
then encrypted by the EK and sent, along withC, to the SDR-
MD.
Upon receiving C and C′, the SDR-MD authenticates the
manufacturer if the received C is equal to the one that the
SDR-MD has previously generated. If authentication fails,
the SDR-MD terminates the connection; otherwise, it ob-
tains C′, sends it back to the manufacturer, and requests the
necessary R-CFG.
The manufacturer then authenticates the device. If au-
thentication fails, the manufacturer terminates the connec-
tion; otherwise, it sends the requested R-CFG encrypted by
the EK. The SDR-MD receives the R-CFG, verifies it, and
checks the R-CFG data integrity. If the R-CFG tests show
no negative results, the SDR-MD installs the R-CFG and ac-
knowledges the manufacturer. The connection is then re-
leased.
After releasing the connection, the SDR-MD installs the
R-CFG and stores the Att(R-CFG) value in R1. Whenever the
SDR-MD is booting up, the AM Eng calculates a new Att(R-
CFG) value, which is then passed to the AC Eng to be com-
pared with R1. If Att(R-CFG) = R1, the current radio config-
uration is trusted. On the other hand, if Att(R-CFG) = R1,
the SDR-DM blocks the use of any service.
3.4. The anticloning scheme
One of the more dangerous threats in SDR wireless commu-
nication is cloning. SDR-MD cloning is considered a federal
crime. According to [20], telecommunication fraud losses
are estimated at more than a billion dollars yearly. A large
amount of this loss is due to cloning. Besides illegal billing,
cloned units increase the competition of shared resources,
which increases network congestion and degrades network
services. Furthermore, the impact of overload traﬃc from
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Figure 4: R-CGF verification and data integrity check.
cloned units is unpredictable. Thus, the estimation of traf-
fic patterns is imprecise for network planning.
The anticloning scheme, which is part of the proposed
fraud-prevention framework, is designed to provide a core
set of hardware and software technologies that provide the
basis for a wireless network environment free of cloned units.
Unlike other cloning detection schemes, the proposed
anticloning scheme not only detects cloned units, but also
elevates the level of diﬃculty to clone a valid unit. Also, as
a new feature, the SDR-MD is aware of cloning, that is, an
SDR-MD is able to discover if it is a cloned unit and take
the necessary steps to block the use of the network services.
Another advantage is that the anticloning framework is in-
dependent of technology, working well for diﬀerent wireless
technologies.
3.4.1. Entering a valid state
The SDR-MD comes from the manufacturer in an invalid
state, that is, it does not have the AC, therefore, it cannot
identify itself to the network. After obtaining the AC, the
SDR-MD enters a temporary state, that is, it is able to prove
its identity, however, it does not have a phone number yet, it
does not have the CFG file installed. After obtaining the CFG,
the SDR-MD finally reaches a valid state. It is able to identify
itself and use the network services.
Figure 6 depicts the transition states that the SDR-MD
has to go through in order to reach a valid state. Note that
anytime after the SDR-MD has reached the valid state, it may
need a newR-CFG file or a newCFG file.While obtaining any
of those files, the SDR-MD goes to a temporary state. With
the new data locally stored, the security checks are executed
and the SDR-MD goes back to the valid state.
To obtain a valid AC, the SDR-MD has to execute the at-
testation credential protocol (ACP) depicted in Figure 7. The
ACP is a communication process between the SDR-MD and
the Privacy CA and it is executed only one time per each EK.
Whenever the manufacturer generates a new EK, it in-
forms the Privacy CA, in a safe way, about that EK. The
Privacy CA, like the manufacturer, maintains a database of
all available EKs (CA EKDB), indexed by MD(EK). This
database has all information that the Privacy CA needs to
know about each SDR-MD produced and links each SDR-
MD to its AC.
The ACP steps are defined as follows. First, the SDR-
MD contacts the Privacy CA and sends the value R0 =
Att(EK). The Privacy CA looks for a matching MD(EK) in
the CA EKDB. If it finds a match, the Privacy CA obtains the
EK of that unit and acknowledges the unit. If no equivalent
MD(EK) is found, either the manufacturer failed to inform
the Privacy CA about this unit or this is an invalid EK. Thus,
the Privacy CA does not provide an AC to the unit.
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Figure 6: Transition states of an SDR-MD.
Second, the Privacy CA generates an AK pair and the unit
authenticates the Privacy CA. The unit generates a nonce C
and sends it to the Privacy CA encrypted by the EK. The Pri-
vacy CA obtains C and sends it back along with an encrypted
message containing the AK pair. Upon receiving the message,
the unit verifies C, authenticating the Privacy CA.
Third, after authenticating the Privacy CA, the unit ob-
tains the AK pair and acknowledges the Privacy CA. The Pri-
vacy CA then generates the AC = [AKpub]PrivacyCA and sends
it, encrypted by the AKpub to the unit. The unit receives the
AC, decrypts it, and stores it in its TPHP. After that, the con-
nection is finally released.
After obtaining the AC, the final step to enter the valid
state is to have the SDR-MD executing the CFG update pro-
tocol (CUP) to obtain a valid CFG. This protocol is executed
whenever the unit needs a new phone number. Figure 8 de-
picts the CUP step by step.
After connecting to the WO’s server, the unit sends its
AC and the value of R2 = Att(CFG) along with a nonce C
encrypted by the WO’s public key. The WO’s public key is
obtained a priori through a secure protocol. If this is a new
unit, the value of R2 is null.
Upon receiving the AC, the WO verifies if the AC is null.
If the comparison is positive, the unit is a clone and the WO
terminates the connection. Otherwise, the CUP continues its
normal flow.
The WO uses the Privacy CA’s public key and decrypts
the AC, obtaining the AKpub. The WO has a database (DB),
indexed by the AKpub, that contains information about each
SDR-MD in a valid state, such as phone number and user
name. Next, the WO looks for a matching AKpub in the DB.
If it finds a match, it verifies MD(CFG) = R2. If the compar-
ison is negative, this is an invalid unit; either this is a cloned
unit or a masquerade attack is occurring, and countermea-
sures are taken.
On the other hand, if the comparison is positive, this is a
valid unit. The WO then obtains C and generates a nonce C′
to authenticate the unit. C is concatenated with C′ and sent
encrypted by the AKpub to the SDR-MD. If the AKpub is not
in the DB, this is a unit in the temporary state.
Upon receiving KAKpub{C‖C′} from the WO, the unit au-
thenticates the WO if the received C is equal to the one pre-
viously generated. If authentication fails, the SDR-MD ter-
minates the connection. Otherwise, it sends C′ back to the
WO.
Next, the WO authenticates the unit by verifying C′.
If authentication fails, the WO terminates the connection.
Otherwise, the WO generates a new CFG and stores the
MD(CFG) value in the DB. The unit receives the CFG en-
crypted by its AKpub and decrypts it. The unit then stores the
CFG in the protected storage of TRC2 and installs the new
phone number.
Next, the AM Eng measures Att(CFG) and writes the
value in R2. The unit then sends this value encrypted by the
WO’s public key to the WO. The WO verifies the value and
acknowledges the unit if the comparison is positive. Other-
wise, it informs the unit that an error occurred during the
CFG installation step. This step is repeated in the case of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: The CFG update protocol.
errors. After receiving an acknowledgment, the unit releases
the connection.
After obtaining the AC from the Privacy CA and the CFG
file from the WO, the SDR-MD finally reaches a valid state.
Therefore, the unit is ready to use all the services oﬀered
by the WO. Figure 9 depicts the tamper-protected hardware
package when the SDR-MD is in the valid state.
Note that the clone signal, sent by the ACEng, propagates
outside the TPHP to the CPU and inside the TPHP to the
TRC2, where it sets the AC to null if the SDR-MD is a clone
unit.
3.4.2. Cloning-aware procedure
The cloning-aware procedure is implemented in both sides,
the WO and the SDR-MD, and is responsible for detecting
whether the SDR-MD is a valid unit or a cloned unit.
After the unit has connected to the WO and requested
a service, the cloning-aware procedure starts in the SDR-
MD side. New Att(EK) and Att(CFG) values are measured
by the AM Eng and sent to the AC Eng, which also receives
the current value of R0 and R2 from the AR Eng. The AC
Eng compares the values and signalizes 1 for a valid unit, if
Att(EK) = R0 and Att(CFG) = R2, or 0 for a cloned unit, if
Att(EK) = R0 or Att(CFG) = R2. In this fashion the SDR-
MD is aware of cloning. Figure 10 illustrates the procedure.
If the SDR-MD is a valid unit, the AC is sent and the WO
cloning-aware procedure begins.
In the WO side, the procedure works basically as an au-
thentication module. The WO obtains the AC and verifies if
it is valid or null. If the AC is null, the WO terminates the
connection, since the unit is a clone. Otherwise, the WO ob-
tains the AKpub from the AC and looks for a match in the DB.
If there is no match, the service is denied. If there is a match,
the WO prepares to authenticate the unit. If the unit is cor-
rectly authenticated, the WO allows the use of the service.
On the other hand, if the unit is not authenticated, the WO
concludes that this unit is trying to use other unit’s AC (mas-
querade attack) and denies the service. Figure 11 illustrates
the procedure.

















































































































































Figure 11: Cloning-aware procedure: WO side.
4. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
The experiments were executed using J2ME, which is a
lightweight java version, specifically designed to be used with









Figure 12: The experiment set-up.
Figure 12. An SDR-MD, in this case a Sharp Zaurus PDA SL-
5600 with CPU speed of 400MHz, 32MB SDRAM, Linux
OS, and J2ME support, connects through an 11Mbps wire-
less link to a Pentium 4 2.6GHz server with 256MB RAM.
4.1. The secure SDR R-CFG download protocol
Two preliminary experiments involving the secure SDR R-
CFG download protocol and the secure R-CFG/CFG mod-
ule are described. In the first experiment, the time the R-
CFG/CFG security module takes to identify invalid R-CFGs
and delete them is measured. The second experiment com-
pares the secure protocol execution when using an unsecured
connection : HTTP, a lightweight secure connection, LSSL
[19], and the SSL protocol [21].
The graph in Figure 13 shows the results of the first ex-
periment. The MD5 algorithm is used to calculate the finger-
print and to perform the data integrity check. As expected,
the larger the R-CFG is, the longer it takes to perform the
security checks.
Figure 14 depicts the results of the second experiment.
Note that the secure protocol with unsecured connection
presents best performance, since it does not need to spend
time with the cipher suite handshake and other extra steps
needed by secure connections. In case secure connections are
necessary, the use of the LSSL is suggested since it presents
better performance than the SSL, as can be noticed in this
experiment.
4.2. Anticloning scheme
It is expected that the anticlone scheme will not add any
further delay on the obtainment of network services when
comparing with the GSM and UMTS techniques. Although
SDR mobile devices are constrained by nature, encryption
and decryption operations are only executed for small pieces
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Figure 13: Time to identify invalid R-CFGs.
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Figure 14: Comparing the secure protocol varying the connection
type.
of information such as the 2048-bit EK and AK pair, and
the 48-bit nonce C. Furthermore, the attestation engines and
the random number generator in the TPHP are specialized
pieces of hardware that can quickly execute data integrity
measurements and generate a 48-bit random number.
5. CORRECTNESS PROOFS
This section presents a list of possible attacks involving the
R-CFG files and how the secure SDR R-CFG protocol avoids
those attacks. It then continues with correctness proofs that
show that the fraud-prevention framework provides an envi-
ronment free of cloned units.
Table 4 illustrates common methods of attacks that fail
against the proposed protocol.
Next, the correctness proofs are presented. It begins with
three lemmas. The first lemma shows that only an SDR-MD
with a valid EK is provided an AC. The second lemma shows
that an SDR-MD only obtains a new CFG when its identity
is successfully proved. Finally, the third lemma shows that
only valid CFGs, that is, CFGs that have been generated and
signed by the WO, can be installed by an SDR-MD.
The proofs continue with two final theorems. The first
theorem proves that there is no possibility to clone an SDR-
MD over the air. The second theorem guarantees that only a
valid SDR-MD can use the network services.
Lemma 1. The Privacy CA only attests the identity of SDR-
MDs that have valid EKs.
Proof. Since the Privacy CA has a database of valid EKs and
this database is assumed to be secured stored, any SDR-MD
that requests an AC and sends an invalid MD(EK) value, that
is, hash of an EK that is not generated by the manufacturer,
has the AC denied.
A replay attack is not possible since the ACP is executed
only once per each EK. Impersonation of the SDR-MD, that
is, masquerade attack, is noticed by the authentication step.
Lemma 2. No SDR-MD obtains a CFG file unless its identity
is successfully proved.
Proof. According to the CUP definition, only after being au-
thenticated by the WO, the SDR-MD is given a new CFG.
This eliminates the possibility of masquerade attacks and re-
play attacks.
Only after responding correctly to the challenge gener-
ated by theWO, the SDR-MD is given a new CFG. Therefore,
no SDR-MD obtains a new CFG file unless it has proved its
identity.
Lemma 3. Only valid CFG files are installed in each SDR-MD.
Proof. To install a new CFG, the SDR-MD must execute the
CUP. According to the CUP definition, before receiving a
new CFG the SDR-MD authenticates the WO by verifying
{R2}WO = [MD(CFG)]. If the comparison is positive, then
the SDR-MD authenticates the WO. Thus, masquerade and
replay attacks are eliminated.
After authentication, the SDR-MD receives a new CFG =
[Phone no.]WO. Since masquerade and replay attacks fail,
only the WO could have sent this message, and the final step
to validate the CFG occurs. The SDR-MD verifies the WO’s
signature in the CFG. When the signature is successfully ver-
ified, the CFG is considered valid and the TPHP stores and
installs the new CFG.
Theorem 1. It is guaranteed that there is no possibility to clone
an SDR-MD over the air.
Proof. In order to clone an SDR-MDover the air, one attacker
must obtain the EK of the victim or a combination of valid
AK pair, valid AC, and valid CFG.
Since the EK and AKprivate are never disclosed by the
TPHP, the attacker has no possibility to obtain the EK nor
the AK pair of a victim. According to Lemma 2, the attacker
must prove its identity to obtain a valid CFG, thus if the at-
tacker uses an AC that is not his/hers, the WO will notice it
and deny a new valid CFG.
A Fraud-Prevention Framework for SDR Mobile Devices 411
Table 4: Possible attacks and how the secure protocol avoids them.
Attacks Description Protection
Access control
Clients using unauthorized services
Protocol employs client authentication
or trying to download data they should not
Masquerade
An entity pretends to be the manufacturer server
Protocol uses mutual authentication
or a client
Confidentiality R-CFG might be confidential
By establishing secure connections or
encrypting, the R-CFG proprietary information
are kept secret
Replay Messages are captured and retransmitted later Mutual authentication avoids replay attacks
Invalid R-CFGs Installing R-CFGs that are not approved by the RA
Every R-CFG is digitally signed
by the RA and verified by the SDR-MD
R-CFG Integrity R-CFG modified after it has been approved
Protocol employs one-way hash functions
to guarantee data integrity
With no other way to clone an SDR-MD over the air, the
only way to bill someone else’s account is to capture his/her
AC when transmitted over the air. However, theWO cloning-
aware procedure will detect that the captured AC does not
belong to that unit and it will deny any service.
Theorem 2. It is guaranteed that only a valid SDR-MD can
use the wireless operator services.
Proof. According to the WO cloning-aware procedure, in or-
der to use the network services the SDR-MD must present
a valid AC. By Lemma 1, only SDR-MDs with valid EKs are
able to obtain a valid AC. Therefore, unit with an invalid EK
does not have a valid AC and cannot use the WO’s services.
According to Theorem 1, there is no way to clone an
SDR-MD over the air, and impersonation of other SDR-MDs
by capturing their AC is noticed by the WO cloning-aware
procedure. Thus, the only other way to clone an SDR-MD is
to have physical access to its TPHP.
However, if an attacker successfully disassembles the
TPHP without damaging it and is able to copy the TPHP
to another SDR-MD’s TPHP, Lemma 3 and the SDR-MD
cloning-aware procedure guarantee that the SDR-MD that
received the cloned TPHP denies the use of the network ser-
vices. The value of R2 on the cloned TPHP and the value of
the current MD(CFG) in the device are diﬀerent. Thus, the
SDR-MD blocks the use of any services.
Since the SDR-MD cloning-aware procedure blocks the
use of any service by cloned units and the WO cloning-aware
procedure notices masquerade attacks, it is guaranteed that
only a valid SDR-MD can use the wireless operator services.
In summary, the fraud-prevention framework elevates
the level of diﬃculty to clone an SDR-MD. The only way to
clone one SDR-MD that employs the framework would be
disassembling the TPHP from the SDR-MD and reading its
contents. Since the TPHP is physically bound to other parts
of the SDR-MD, attempts to disassemble it would probably
damage the TPHP. Even if an attacker successfully disassem-
bles the TPHP without damaging it, the equipment to read
and copy the TPHP is so expensive that the attacker would
practically have no gain, if any, in doing so.
6. CONCLUSION
To greatly enhance the overall security of SDR-MDs, a fraud-
prevention framework is proposed. The fraud-prevention
framework is composed of new pieces of hardware, mod-
ules, and protocols. The framework oﬀers security monitor-
ing against malicious attacks and viruses, protects sensitive
information, creates and protects an identity for the system,
employs a secure protocol for radio configuration download,
and finally, establishes an anticloning scheme which guaran-
tees that no units can be cloned over the air, and elevates the
level of diﬃculty to clone units if the attacker has physical
access to the mobile device. Even if cloned units exist, the an-
ticloning scheme is able to identify and deny services to those
units.
Preliminary experiments show that the framework is
able to identify invalid R-CFGs with minimal delay. Proofs
that analyze correctness of the framework show that the
fraud-prevention framework provides an environment free
of cloned units.
Future work includes the execution of several ex-
periments that will measure performance of the fraud-
prevention framework, and comparisons with other state-of-
the-art related works.
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